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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Farrell argued the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because the window tinting in the car was original equipment that fell under
the  statutory  exception,  but  Officer  Reese  ignored  his  statements  to  that  effect  and  failed  to
investigate whether the exception applied.  In response, the State argues Officer Reese’s
investigation was reasonable, and thus suggests it is reasonable for law enforcement to ignore the
exception in the statute.  Moreover, the investigation was clearly not reasonable as the window
tinting did fall under the exception.
Additionally, instead of responding to Mr. Farrell’s argument that an investigation
conducted in this way renders the statutory exception meaningless, the State attempts to reframe
the issue.  It claims Mr. Farrell’s request for the Court to second-guess the investigative method
employed by Officer Reese is contrary to law.  This is a red herring.  The Court would not have
to second-guess Officer Reese’s “investigative method” because the statute required him to
investigate whether the exception applied, and—even though Mr. Farrell repeatedly told him it
did apply—the video shows Officer Reese failed to even try to investigate that.  Instead, he
issued an unwarranted citation, which unlawfully prolonged the stop.  Further, Officer Reese’s
tint meter could not show whether the rear window fell under the exception.   It could only show
the degree of tinting, and the statute makes it clear that factory window tinting is not illegal.
Thus, it was incumbent upon Officer Reese to determine whether the tint was original equipment
or the result of an aftermarket product such as a tinting film.  The marking showed the rear
window had a tint of 20%.  The dealer documentation showed the rear window was original
equipment.  Therefore, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Farrell’s motion to suppress.
2
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Farrell’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Farrell’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Farrell’s Motion To Suppress
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Farrell argued that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because Officer Reese acted unreasonably and unlawfully prolonged the
traffic stop when he failed to investigate whether the window tinting fell under the statutory
exception in I.C. § 49-944(5) and issued an unwarranted citation.  (App. Br., pp.8-11.)  In
response, the State claims it was reasonable for Officer Reese to pursue his investigation with his
tint meter.  (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)  However, whether a window falls under the exception in
I.C. § 49-944(5) cannot be determined with a tint meter.  As such, in order to conduct a
reasonable and complete investigation of whether a violation of the statute had occurred and a
citation  was  warranted,  Officer  Reese  had  to  look  at  the  window  and  determine  from  the
marking1 whether it was original equipment, or whether some type of film had been applied to
the window to cause the reading on his tint meter.  He did not do that.  Instead, he continued to
ignore Mr. Farrell’s statements, not to mention the plain language of the statute, used his tint
meter only, and then instructed his back-up officer to write an unwarranted citation, so he could
run  his  drug  dog  around  the  car.   Nevertheless,  the  State  asserts  it  was  reasonable  for  Officer
Reese “to continue the traffic mission” by writing a citation.  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  It was clearly not
1 The State claims Mr. Farrell presented no “evidence of the marking’s location other than to say
it  was  on  ‘Defendant’s  car  window.’”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.6  n.2.)   This  is  baffling  because  the  rear
window was the only window at issue in this case.  It was the window that Officer Reese said he
was “concerned about.”  (Exhibit B at 8:15 – 9:45; see also R., p.21.)  It was also the window for
which the citation was issued.  (R., pp.21, 131-32.)  Thus, it was unnecessary for defense counsel
to  state  in  his  affidavit  that  the  marking  was  on  the  rear  window.   Further,  the  photo  of  the
window, which showed the marking indicating the window had a factory tint of 20% and was
attached to defense counsel’s affidavit, clearly showed multiple defroster lines.  (R., p.121.)  It is
common knowledge that only rear windows have multiple defroster lines.
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reasonable because Officer Reese ignored the statute’s exception and concluded the rear window
was in violation of the statute when in fact it was not.
The  State  also  claims  that  Mr.  Farrell’s  argument  would  require  “the  Court  to  second-
guess the investigative method employed by” Officer Reese, and this is “contrary to law”
because an “officer’s diligence is not subject to a ‘post hoc evaluation’ for ‘some alternative
means  by  which  the  objectives  of  the  police  might  have  been  accomplished.’”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.5
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).  However, Sharpe is inapposite
here.  This was not a situation where Officer Reese could choose not to investigate whether the
exception applied; I.C. § 49-944 required him to do so.  There was no such controlling statute at
issue in Sharpe.
The Sharpe Court wrote that it was “appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. at 686 (citations omitted).  It
then stated, “A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are
acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in
unrealistic second-guessing.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The Court held
the extended duration of the traffic stop was reasonable precisely because the delay
was “attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of [a codefendant], who sought to elude
the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Except for [the codefendant’s]
maneuvers, only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention would likely have taken
place.” Id. at 687-88 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court stated that the “somewhat longer
detention  was  simply  the  result”  of  a  graduated  response  to  the  demands  of  that  specific
situation. Id. at 688 (citation omitted).  The Court thus found that the agent who stopped
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Mr. Sharpe “pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner,” and there was no
evidence presented “that the officers were dilatory in their investigation.” Id. at 687.2
In this case, the traffic stop was not a “swiftly developing situation.”  Indeed, the video of
the stop shows that Mr. Farrell and the driver were cooperative, and Mr. Farrell was calmly
telling the officers that the windows in the car were “factory” or “stock” tint.  (See Exhibit B at
1:50 – 9:40.)  More importantly, this case does not require the Court to imagine some alternative
means by which Officer Reese’s objective could have been accomplished, nor does the Court
have to engage in unrealistic second-guessing of Officer Reese’s actions.  The video of the stop
clearly shows Officer Reese was dilatory in his investigation because, pursuant to I.C. § 49-
944(5), he was required to investigate whether the window fell under the exception.  He never
made any attempt to do so.  Failing to do so was unreasonable as it rendered the exception
meaningless, and the State itself emphatically agrees that, in the context of a traffic stop, “[t]he
question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police
acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.”  (Resp. Br., p.5 (quoting Sharpe, 470
U.S.  at  687)  (emphasis  in  original).)   Like  the  district  court,  the  State  ignores  the  fact  that  the
video showed Officer Reese failed to conduct a complete investigation of whether there was
actually a violation of the statute.3
2 The  State  also  relies  on State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796-97 (1998).  (Resp. Br., p.5.)
However,  that  opinion  was  also  focused  on  the  duration  of  the  stop  in  light  of  the  specific
circumstances. Id.  There  was  no  controlling  statute  at  issue  that  required  the  officer  to
investigate whether an exception applied.
3 Even  if  Officer  Reese  was  not  aware  of  the  exception,  and  such  a  “mistake  of  law”  could
somehow be considered objectively reasonable for an officer who actually carries a tint meter in
his patrol car, Idaho has not adopted a good faith mistake of law exception to the exclusionary
rule. State v. Pettit, 162 Idaho 849, 855 (Ct. App. 2017).
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The  district  court  wrote,  “The  limited  issue  before  this  Court  is  whether  Officer  Reese
had reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws
due  to  his  suspicion  of  an  equipment  violation  based  upon  the  darkness  of  the  tint  .  .  .  .”
(R., p.152.)  It also found, “Officer Reese then investigated his observation by applying the tint
meter to the window, which confirmed the tint was darker on the back window tha[n] allowed by
the statute.”  (R., p.154.)  Based on this, the district court implicitly found that issuing a citation
was reasonable at that point.  (R., p.154.)  However, it was clearly not reasonable because the
vehicle was not being driven contrary to traffic laws.
Indeed, the district court’s analysis was incomplete because the tint meter could not show
whether the window tinting fell under the exception.  Nor could it show whether a tinting film
had been applied to the rear window to make it darker than allowed.  After all, this is what the
statute is intended to control:  “It is unlawful for any person to place, install, affix or apply any
window tinting film or sunscreening device to the windows of any motor vehicle . . . .”  I.C. § 49-
944(1) (emphasis added).  And the relevant subsection reads as follows:  “Nonreflective window
tinting film or sunscreening devices that have a light transmission of not less than thirty-five
percent (35%) with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent (3%) . . . may be applied to
. . . the rear window.”  I.C. § 49-944(1)(b) (emphasis added).
Idaho Code § 49-944(5), however, makes it clear that the statute is not intended to
penalize drivers whose cars are originally equipped with darker windows.  And Officer Reese
could determine, only through further investigation, whether window tinting film had been
applied to the window, or the car came equipped with the window tinting.  The marking showed
the window had 20% tinting originally (R., p.121.), but Officer Reese failed to investigate this at
all.  He never even looked at the marking.  If officers are not required to investigate this statutory
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exception for factory tinting in the field, the exception is meaningless.  (See App. Br., pp.10-11.)
Further, as argued by defense counsel, the marking also showed the tint was original equipment
“affixed by the manufacturer GM . . . .”  (R., p.111.)  Had he looked at the window, that is what
Officer Reese would have seen.
In its respondent’s brief, the State engages in a similarly flawed analysis.  It states,
“Initially, there was nothing unreasonable with the officer investigating whether the window
complied with I.C. § 49-944(1).”  (Resp. Br., p.6)  This is accurate as to subsection (1), but it is
only the first part of what is required for an investigation to be reasonable under the statute.  The
State also argues, “Using the light meter was a reasonable way to make this determination, and
had the meter shown 35% or better light transmission, the investigation would have been
complete.”  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  Again, while the tint meter could show whether the window was in
compliance with subsection (1), it could not show whether it fell under the exception in
subsection (5).
The State also argues that “[n]othing in the marking shows that the window was original
equipment on the car.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  This argument is, in point of fact, largely irrelevant.  It
is irrelevant because Officer Reese never looked at the window marking.  Indeed, he never
looked at the window to investigate subsection (5) of the statute.  (Exhibit B at 5:30 – 10:00.)
And  that  was  the  argument  made  to  the  district  court.   (R.,  pp.111-13.)   The  State  has  not
acknowledged that I.C. § 49-944(5) must also be investigated.  Instead, the State’s only argument
is that if a tint meter shows that subsection (1) of the statute is violated, a citation should issue.  It
even argues that the marking might not have shown that the tint was factory applied.  (Resp.
Br., pp.6-7.)
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That is simply not the way the law operates.  Indeed, a window marking is no different
than a temporary permit, which “carries with it a presumption of validity, not of invalidity.”
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2007).  As Salois noted with regard to permits,
“[t]he State’s position would allow law enforcement officers to presume that temporary permits
are invalid per se. . . .” Id.  While Salois was about the reasonableness of the initial stop, the
notion that when an officer sees something that indicates legality, that officer cannot assume that
it is nevertheless probably illegal applies here.  Yet that is the State’s argument—that there was
no photographic evidence showing that the marking Officer Reese would have seen would have
proven it was placed there by the manufacturer of the car.  (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)  Thus, the State
argues that it is reasonable for an officer to assume illegality and issue a citation.  There was no
evidence presented by the State, however, to show that what Officer Reese would have seen, had
he conducted a complete investigation and looked at the marking, would indicate an after-market
application of the tint either.
The district court had a photo showing part of the marking that was on the rear window.
(R., p.121.)  That photo does not depict everything written on the window.  (R., p.111.)  Had
Officer Reese looked at the marking, he, of course, would have seen everything written on the
window.  The district court never mentioned the photo of the marking, and it ignored the fact that
Officer Reese never looked at the marking before issuing a citation, so it apparently assumed,
contrary to Salois, that what was not shown in the photo would not have indicated factory-placed
tint.  However, the district court had before it evidence to the contrary—the dealer
documentation supported what Mr. Farrell had been telling Officer Reese and what the factory-
applied markings showed (R., pp.138-43, 154.), but it presumed that looking at the rear window
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marking would not have revealed something useful to Officer Reese regarding the exception in
the statute.  The district court erred when it denied Mr. Farrell’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Farrell respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2019.
/s/ Reed P. Anderson
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